
Published 20.01.2025
Keywords
- Motivation,
- Reputation,
- Reporting,
- Investment Analysts
Copyright (c) 2025 Patricia Crifo, Hind Sami (Author)

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
How to Cite
Abstract
This paper develops a model to explore the dynamic interaction between incentive contracts and financial analysts' efforts in producing high-quality research, while accounting for both ethical and reputational concerns. Our findings indicate that compensation structures shaped by reputational and ethical considerations can give rise to incentive-related challenges. Specifically, an exclusive reliance on financial incentives exacerbates conflicts of interest, as analysts may prioritize short-term gains at the expense of their long-term reputation. In contrast, a more balanced approach, which integrates both monetary and non-monetary rewards aligned with analysts' intrinsic work ethic, allows them to better resist such pressures, leading to enhanced research quality and a strengthened long-term reputation.
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