Ethical Review of Social Sciences ISSN: 2978-8358

Durham & Thunmann, 2025. Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license.

https://doi.org/10.70150/b3d9ng06.

ADAM SMITH WAS CONSISTENT IN THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS AND

THE WEALTH OF NATIONS ON THE ROLE OF PRUDENCE (SELF INTEREST): DAS

UTILITARIAN ECONOMIST VIEW IS THE PROBLEM

MICHAEL EMMETT BRADY*

Abstract:

Adam Smith was very consistent in both the Wealth of Nations and

in The Theory of Moral Sentiments concerning the role of the virtue

of prudence (self-interest) in both books. Like all advocates of

virtue ethics, the first virtue that must be mastered had to be the

Virtue of Prudence, which required the satisfaction of the

necessary condition of being able to take care of oneself and family

first, before any other virtue could possibly be attempted, applied

and mastered. Smith assumed that readers of the Wealth of Nations

had previously read his Theory of Moral Sentiments, so that they

understood that the butcher, brewer, and baker all had to succeed

financially first before they could consider the interests of others

second. Only after a clear and large economic surplus had been

built up by the butcher, brewer, and baker from their small

businesses would it be possible to meet the interests of others

through the practice of the virtue of benevolence. There is simply

no contradiction or inconsistency between Smith’s position, made

all through The Theory of Moral Sentiments, that prudence is the

most important virtue and that all other virtues must come second

or after prudence (self-interest) has been successfully deployed

first. Smith though it is obvious that we get our dinner from the

prudent behavior (self-interest or self-love) of the butcher, brewer,

and baker and not from the virtue of Benevolence because

Benevolence can only be practiced if the butcher, brewer, and

baker have been successful in their businesses in amassing a

surplus. The butcher, brewer, and baker can’t practice

Benevolence if they are suffering losses or merely breaking even.

The virtue of benevolence should not be confused with altruism.

Keywords: Virtue, Benevolence, Prudence, Utility

Maximization, Self -Interest, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham.

JEL Codes: A12, A13, A23, B12,B15

Introduction

The paper is organized in the following manner.

Section Two will examine the role that prudence,

which is just another name for self-interest and self-

love, played in the Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776)

and in Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1959).

Section Three will examine how utilitarian

economists had to reinterpret Smith, so as to make him

compatible with the rational, calculating, utility

maximiser created by Jeremy Bentham in 1787. This

was done by creating the Invisible Hand of the Market.

Without the Invisible Hand of the Market,

representative government becomes an absolute

necessity, so that it can regulate the affairs of men and

prevent the tyranny of the Majority, which is hidden

in the Benthamite expression, the greatest good for the

greatest number.

It is the Utilitarian economists of the 18th, 19th,

20th, and 21st centuries who created the myth that

Smith had been inconsistent and/or had made

contradictory statements in the two books, because

these utilitarian economists rejected Virtue ethics and

sought to place Bentham’s conflicting definition of

self(ish) interests in place of Smith’s self-interest as

representing prudence in the Wealth of Nations. This

was accomplished by a severe misinterpretation of the

butcher, brewer, and baker quotation to support their

claim that Smith had created an Invisible Hand of the

Market force, to replace Hobbes’s government force,

as the force that was the social institution that

regulated the conflicting self(ish) interests of all

citizens in the pursuit of the virtue of justice, so as to

prevent the war of all against all. Utilitarian

economists claimed that Smith’s Invisible Hand of the

Market was a natural force, whose results were due to

completely voluntary exchange actions, whereas

government force was unnatural and involuntary.

Smith’s mythical Invisible Hand of the Market

became the natural reconciler of all conflicting self

(ish) interests. Thus, there was really no need for

government at all.

1. Smith on Prudence in TTOU and WN

Smith recognized that no one could make any

progress in any facet of their lives, be it marital,

familial, economic, social, educational, issues

concerning one’s health, career, longevity, and

vitality, without being prudent. Every practitioner of

Virtue Ethics, from the Old Testament prophets to

Buddha and Confucius to Gandhi, recognized this

fact. A detailed look at Smith’s understanding of the

* Lecturer, California State University, Dominguez

Hills, United States.

mandmbrady@juno.com.

Michael Emmett Brady, 2025

importance of Prudence as taking care of oneself first

shows why self-interest and self-love are prudent

behaviour. Just as you can’t dig a hole in the ground

effectively and efficiently without a shovel, one can’t

lay the basic foundation for living the virtuous life

without regard to how to care properly for oneself

before considering how to help others.

First, there is Prudence:

“Thus, the most perfect state of human nature, the

most complete happiness that man is capable of

enjoying, is bodily ease and security or tranquillity of

mind. To obtain this great end of natural desire is the

sole object of all the virtues, which are desirable not

on their own account but because of their 3 tendency

to bring about this situation of ease and tranquillity.

“Take the case of prudence. It is the source and

energiser of all the virtues, but it isn’t desirable on its

own account. That careful and laborious and

circumspect state of mind – always on the watch for

even the most distant consequences of every action –

can’t be pleasant or agreeable for its own sake. What

makes it valuable is its tendency to procure the

greatest goods and to keep off the greatest evils.”

Then, there is Temperance and Prudence:

“Similarly with temperance – curbing and

restraining our natural passions for enjoyment, which

is the job of temperance, can’t ever be desirable for its

own sake. The whole value of this virtue arises from

its utility, from its enabling us to postpone the present

enjoyment for the sake of a greater to come, or to

avoid a greater pain that might ensue from it.

Temperance, in short, is nothing but prudence with

regard to pleasure.”

And then there is Fortitude and Prudence:

“The situations that fortitude would often lead us

into – keeping hard at work, enduring pain, risking

danger or death – are surely even further from being

objects of natural desire. They are chosen only to

avoid greater evils. We submitted to hard work in

order to avoid the greater shame and pain of poverty,

and we risk danger and death

 in defence of our liberty and property,

which are means and instruments of

pleasure and happiness, or

 in defence of our country, the safety of

which necessarily includes our own

safety. Fortitude enables us to do all this

cheerfully, as the best that is possible in

our present 4 situation; it’s really just

prudence – good judgment and presence

of mind in properly appreciating pain,

labour, and danger, always choosing the

less in order to avoid the greater.”

Finally, there is Justice and Prudence:

“It is the same case with justice. Abstaining from

taking something that belongs to someone else isn’t

desirable on its own account: it’s not certain that it

would be better for you if I kept this item of mine than

that you should possess it. But you oughtn’t to take any

of my belongings from me because if you do you’ll

provoke the resentment and indignation of mankind.

·If that happens, the security and tranquillity of your

mind will be destroyed. You’ll be filled with fear and

confusion by the thought of the punishment that you

will imagine men are always ready to inflict on you...

The other sort of justice that consists in giving good

help to various people according to their relations to

us – as neighbours, kinsmen, friends, benefactors,

superiors, or equals – is recommended by the same

reasons. Acting properly in all these different

relations brings us the esteem and love of those we live

with, and doing otherwise arouses their contempt and

hatred. By the one we naturally secure, and by the

other we necessarily endanger, our own ease and

tranquillity, which are the great and ultimate objects

of all our desires. So, the whole virtue of justice – the

most important of all the virtues – is no more than

discreet and prudent conduct with regard to our

neighbours.” (Smith, 1759, Part VII, pp. 147-149).

Smith has carefully shown how each of the four

major virtues is connected to the virtue of prudence.

This is why Aristotle, following Plato (Socrates),

Smith, Aquinas, and others, list Prudence as first

among the four major virtues. Aquinas added three

additional virtues. It can be argued that Beneficent

actions (Benevolence or charity) are the most

important of the three additional virtues. However, it

will be impossible to practice charity if no surplus has

been built up by prudent actions. Thus, it is not

possible to practice benevolence later if Prudence has

not been practiced successfully first. Smith then looks

at ethical systems that fail to consider the primacy of

prudence:

“Some of the other systems I have described don’t

sufficiently explain what gives the supreme virtue of

benevolence its special excellence, whereas this

system of Hutcheson’s seems to have the opposite

defect, of not sufficiently explaining why we approve

of the inferior virtues of prudence, vigilance,

circumspection, temperance, constancy, firmness. The

only feature of an affection that this system attends to

at all is its aim, the beneficent or harmful effects that

it tends to produce. Its propriety or impropriety, its

suitableness and unsuitableness to the cause that

arouses it, is completely ignored. Also, a regard for

our own private happiness and interest seems often to

be a praiseworthy motive for action. It is generally

supposed that self-interested motives are what lead us

to develop the habits of economy, industry, discretion,

attention, and application of thought, and these are

taken by everyone to be praiseworthy qualities that

deserve everyone’s esteem and approval. It’s true of

course that an action that ought to arise from a

Das Utilitarian Economist View is the Problem

benevolent affection seems to have its beauty spoiled

by an admixture of a selfish motive; but that isn’t

because self-love can never be the motive of a virtuous

action, but only because in the given case the

benevolent motive appears to lack its proper degree of

strength and to be altogether unsuitable to its object.

The person’s character seems to be imperfect, and on

the whole to deserve blame rather than praise. When

an action for which self-love alone ought to be a

sufficient motive has an admixture of benevolence in

its motivation, that isn’t so likely to diminish our sense

of the action’s propriety or of the virtue of the person

who performs it. We’re not ready to suspect anyone of

being defective in selfishness!... But if we really

believe, of any man, that if it weren’t for a concern for

his family and his friends he wouldn’t take proper care

of his health, his life, or his fortune,... that would

undoubtedly be a failing, though one of those likeable

failings that make a person an object of pity rather

than of contempt or hatred. It would somewhat lessen

the dignity and worthiness of his character, however.

Carelessness and lack of economy are universally

disapproved of – not as coming from a lack of

benevolence but from a lack proper attention to the

objects of self-interest.” (Smith, 1759, Part VII, pp.

157-158).

In a nutshell, Smith has very carefully shown that

benevolence is impossible to practice if prudence has

not been practiced successfully first. Prudence is Self

Interest and Self Love. You MUST take care of

yourself first before you can take care of anyone else.

One can imagine a POOR Good Samaritan,

attempting, without any bag of silver coins, horse, oil,

or wine, etc., trying to take care of the beaten and

robbed traveller on the dangerous, winding Road to

Jericho, infested with gangs of robbers and thieves. He

couldn’t possibly have succeeded. Prudence allowed

him to prepare himself for such an undertaking, even

if he never had any inkling in his imagination that such

an event would ever take place. He was prepared

because he was prudent. Thus, Smith says it best when

he states that

“Carelessness and lack of economy are universally

disapproved of – not as coming from a lack of

benevolence but from a lack proper attention to the

objects of self-interest.” (Smith, 1759, Part VII, pp.

157-158).

We can now move on to examine the following

quotation from the WN that has incorrectly been used,

when combined with false claims about Smith’s belief

in some form of an “Invisible Hand of the Market”, to

support the false claim that Smith’s views had

somehow changed from those he had when he wrote

TTMS to when he wrote the WN. G. Kennedy has

shown (see references) that this involves the misbelief

among economists that Smith believed in the

existence of such an Invisible Hand. This Invisible

Hand, magically and effortlessly operating through

markets, transformed individual greed and selfish

interests into aggregate good, so that all society

benefited just as long as the government did not

interfere, or get in the way of, this naturally self-

adjusting system. The self interest in Smith’s Wealth

of Nations (Smith, 1776) came to be construed as

behaviour that was the exact opposite of the kind of

behaviour Smith had advocated in The Theory of

Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1759). Thus, was born the

alleged Adam Smith Problem. There were supposed

to have been two different men named Adam Smith.

The first, younger, Adam Smith advocated the

practice of virtue ethics. This Adam Smith was

concerned with how humans integrated both self-

interest and the interests of others in their decision-

making process as they attempted to apply virtue

ethics. The second, later, Adam Smith supposedly had

come to realize a number of years after he had

published TTMS that he had been incorrect in his

surmise that humans were also concerned with other

human beings well-being. Supposedly, this second,

more mature and knowledgeable, man, also named

Adam Smith, now realized that this was not the case

when it came to analysing the economy. Humans were

really just selfish, greedy, avaricious, covetous,

materialistic, utility maximisers, whose only concern

about others was how interacting with others would

lead to more for themselves. The usual manner by

which Smith’s thought was transformed into

Benthamite Utilitarianism, was by taking small parts

of quotations out of the context from the WN and

bundling them together to present the case for the

Invisible Hand. The Invisible Hand concept is the

claim that participants, acting in free markets,

motivated by selfish interest alone, will, by their

interaction with other participants, automatically

produce the most favourable macroscopic outcome for

all concerned in the aggregate even though their micro

behaviour in not aimed at such a favourable outcome.

This outcome, which leads automatically to the best or

optimal result for society as a whole, is combined with

partial quotes taken out of context like the following

examples:

“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the

brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner but with

regard to their own interest…” (Smith, 1776, p. 13).

and

“Each is led by an invisible hand to promote an end

which was not part of his intention. “ (Smith,1776, p.

423).

These partial quotations are then combined as

“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the

brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner but with

regard to their own interest… Each is led by an

invisible hand to promote an end which was not part

of his intention.” (Smith, 1776).

Michael Emmett Brady, 2025

In this altered form, an unknowing student is faced

with a fait accompli. It appears as if there is an

overwhelming case to be made in support of the

position that Smith did argue for an Invisible Hand, so

that one can substitute utility maximization for

prudence. Unless the student is willing to try to

examine the WN and TTMS in depth, or happens to

discover G. Kennedy’s works on Smith, he faces a

truly daunting task that took the present author ten

years to finish (1994-2004). He will have no choice

but to go along with the Benthamite Utilitarian

interpretation of Adam Smith in which he is being

indoctrinated by the economics profession. Smith’s

detailed analysis in TTMS, of the importance of

prudence as the basic, fundamental virtue, also held in

the WN. Nowhere in the WN does Smith contradict

himself.

2. Misinterpreting Smith

Lert’s consider the following claims:

“As modern economists, we use Adam Smith's

"invisible hand" metaphor confident that we all know

what it means in our discourse: it reflects our

admiration for the elegant and smooth functioning of

the market system as a coordinator of autonomous

individual choices in an interdependent world. But in

Adam Smith's moral philosophy, the invisible hand

has a much broader responsibility: if individuals are

to enjoy the fruits of a classical liberal society, the

invisible hand must not only coordinate individuals'

choices, it must shape the individuals into constructive

social beings- ethical beings. Revisiting Smith's

metaphor provides a valuable lesson: the foundation

of success in creating a constructive classical liberal

society lies in individuals' adherence to a common

social ethics.” (Evensky,1993, p. 197; see also pp. 1-

12 of Evensky, 2005).

and

“Smith's "invisible hand" metaphor reflects his

view that he is representing the invisible connecting

principles of the "immense machine of the universe"

(Smith, 1976b, p. 236) that are the handiwork of the

Deity. To fully appreciate the impact of this

perspective on Smith's moral philosophy, however,

one must bear in mind that Smith (1976b, p. 166) saw

the Deity as not only handy, but also benevolent. The

happiness of mankind, as well as of all other rational

creatures, seems to have been the original purpose

intended by the Author of nature, when he brought

them into existence. No other end seems worthy of that

supreme wisdom and divine benignity which we

necessarily ascribe to him... This is the Deity who

endowed all humans with self-love, and in so doing set

the spring that gives motion to human industry. This

is the Deity who arranged the connecting principles

such that the actions of all those seeking their own

advantage could produce the most efficient allocation

of resources, and thus the greatest possible wealth for

the nation. This is indeed a benevolent designer.”

(Evensky, 1993, p. 200).

Thus, the Deity is the Invisible Hand of the Market

who has “…arranged the connecting principles such

that the actions of all those seeking their own

advantage could produce the most efficient allocation

of resources, and thus the greatest possible wealth for

the nation.” (Evensky, 1993, p. 200).

Evensky’s claim has nothing to do with the virtue

of benevolence, since it can only occur after prudence

is successfully applied first. What Evensky is talking

about is the virtue of prudence but mixes this up with

an all-powerful Deity who carries out the function of

the Invisible Hand of the Market. This can’t be found

anywhere in anything written by Smith, except to

implicitly read into Smith views on religion that are

not his. There is no need to bring in any Invisible hand

to account for/explain/accomplish what mastery of

prudence alone allows one to accomplish.

The virtue of prudence trains decision makers to

use their resources efficiently so that they can take

care of their families, build up a “rainy day” fund

(surplus or economic profit) like the squirrels,

beavers, and the Pharaoh in the Old Testament story

of Joseph and the Pharaoh, so that they can apply

benevolence in an uncertain future. These prudent

actions lay the groundwork for benevolent actions

later on.

Consider the following quotation from the

beginning of TTMS:

“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there

are evidently some principles in his nature, which

interest him in the fortune of others, and render their

happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing

from it except the pleasure of seeing it.” (Smith,1759,

p. 1).

and the following quotation from page 13 of the

WN:

“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the

brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner but with

regard to their own interest…” (Smith, 1776, p. 13).

There is no conflict here. Both statements are

consistent and non-contradictory if a reader has

covered Smith’s full presentation of Virtue ethics in

part VII of TTMS. However, these two quotations are,

on many occasions, combined in order to show some

kind of conflict in Smith (see, for instance, Valdesolo

and DeSteno, 2016, p. 211 and Higgins and Sovoie,

1997, p. 406). Both quotations come very early on in

both works. It is not possible to accurately grasp what

Smith is saying unless the entire TTMS is mastered

and the entire WN is mastered.

Das Utilitarian Economist View is the Problem

3. Conclusion: Keeping Functionality and

Consciousness Unconfused

There were never any contradictions or

inconsistencies about the roles of the four virtues in

either TTMS or WN. The real problem was that the

utilitarian frame of mind of the economics profession

of the 18th,19th, 20th and 21st centuries, sought to

read the WN and TTMS from a utilitarian view of

point, which resulted in the substitution of utility

maximization as defining what self-interest meant.

They seized certain passages, taken out of context, and

created Adam Smith the utilitarian. Smith’s WN

discussions on pages 419-423 about the decisions of

domestic merchants preferring the domestic trade to

the foreign trade, based on risk and ambiguity

aversion, and his discussions about the importance of

providing for one’s self and family first on p. 13 of the

WN, were misinterpreted by economists [See Becker

(1981), Stigler (1971,1976,1982), and McMahon

(1981)] into an Invisible Hand doctrine that was in

direct conflict with TTMS.G. Kennedy (2008, 2009,

2012) has constantly challenged this framework

repeatedly, apparently to no avail.

Conflicts of interest

The author (s) states that there is no conflict of

interests.

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