Ethical Review of Social Sciences ISSN: 2978-8358

Durham & Thunmann, 2025. Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license.

https://doi.org/10.70150/khvbn767.

THE ORIGIN OF MORALITY AND THE MAKING OF THE MORAL PREDICAMENT

GENNADY SHKLIAREVSKY*

Abstract:

Moral dimension is a characteristic feature of most transformative

developments that have occurred in the course of human history.

Moral outrage has fuelled numerous upheavals, uprisings, and

revolutions. Researchers have recognized the important role of

moral outrage during periods of social and political change.

However, they usually tend to explain it by social, political, or

economic factors. They rarely trace this phenomenon to purely

moral factors. This article argues that the primary source of moral

outrage lies in the moral sphere – specifically, in the discrepancy

between the widely recognized moral principles and the actual

practice. The imperative of equality is arguably the most important

and fundamental principle that underpins the existence of morality.

The appeal of the imperative of equality transcends temporal and

cultural boundaries. Yet despite this broad appeal, our social

practice accepts, tolerates, and perpetuates inequality. This article

calls this discrepancy the moral predicament. The article will

analyse the factors that are involved in the making of the moral

predicament. It will identify the source of the imperative of equality

and will explain why this imperative has not been realized in

practice. The article will also consider several relevant issues, such

as the rise of consciousness and morality. Finally, the article will

offer a perspective on how the problem of the moral predicament

can be solved.

Keywords: Moral Predicament, Morality, The Process of

Creation, Consciousness, The Imperative of Equality.

JEL Classification: A13, H890, I310, I390, Z18.

Introduction

Morality has been integral to all major periods of

change in the history of human civilization. Moral

inspiration was an important contributor to the radical

agenda for transforming the world that was put

forward by Christianity. Moral indignation fueled the

great revolutions that ushered in the Modern Age – the

American Revolution of the 18th century, the 19th

century revolutions in Europe, and the Russian

Revolution of 1917. Appeals to morality galvanized

and mobilized the Civil Rights and protest movements

during the 1960s. The current turmoil in the United

States and around the world also has a strong moral

component.

The source of moral outrage in all these

transforming developments has been an all-too-

obvious discrepancy – one might call it predicament--

between the imperative of equality widely recognized

as the most fundamental moral principle and the social

practice that tolerates and perpetuates inequality. We

find this discrepancy offensive to our human dignity

and self-respect. It has no justification in our eyes.

There seems to be no reason why this moral

predicament should continue to exist, particularly

given the wide recognition of the imperative of

equality; and yet it continues to exist. The persistence

of the moral predicament raises many questions

related to the broad subject of morality and its role in

our life.

Morality has been and continues to be the focus of

numerous studies in widely ranging fields and

disciplines: from religion and ethics to sociology,

anthropology, biology, and neurophysiology, to name

just a few. Researchers raise important questions

about the origin of morality, its importance in our

social life, and the prospects for building a moral

society. Yet despite the intense interest in the subject

and its enormous widely recognized importance,

despite the existence of numerous perspectives on the

subject that have been formulated over the years,

definitive answers to the most important problems

related to morality remain elusive; and of all these

problems, the problem of the moral predicament is

arguably the most important.

The problem of the moral predicament challenges

* Bard College, New York, USA

shkliare@bard.edu

Gennady Shkliarevsky, 2025

our understanding of the origin of morality and its

evolution; it also touches on many cognate issues

related to mind, thinking, and consciousness. This

article will focus on the moral predicament and will

explain it origin. It will also try to offer a perspective

on how this problem can be solved. In addressing the

problem of the moral predicament, the article will also

deal with such relevant issue as the origin of morality.

The problem of the moral predicament is complex.

Its solution will require addressing several issues

related to it. One such issue is the existence of the

widely recognized and accepted moral imperative of

equality. In order to solve the problem of the moral

predicament, we have to understand the roots of the

imperative of equality and the reasons for our

enduring commitment to this principle. The problem

of the moral predicament is essentially the problem of

the discrepancy between the imperative of equality

and the existing social practice that accepts, tolerates,

and perpetuates inequality. This discrepancy has been

and remains the source of moral outrage that

persistently fuels tensions and conflicts in our society.

We need to understand the cause of this discrepancy.

Finally, the article will outline a path towards the

solution of the problem of the moral predicament.

Should we abandon the imperative of equality or

should we change our social practice? An answer to

this question requires understanding the reason why

our social practice fails to realize the widely accepted

and compelling moral imperative.

1. Current Perspectives on the Origin of

Morality

As has been indicated in the introduction, one

important issue related to the problem of the moral

predicament is the issue of the origin of morality.

There are numerous perspectives that try to explain the

origin of morality. Their detailed and exhaustive

examination is a formidable task that is certainly

beyond the scope of the current article. A brief

overview will be quite sufficient for its purposes of

this article.

A brief discussion of definition is a good way to

start this overview. Needless to say, there are quite a

few definitions that are used in the current discourse

on morality and its origin. The complexity of the

subject defies attempts to capture the meaning of

morality in formulations that would be sufficiently

clear and comprehensive at the same time. Naturally,

differences are rampant as researchers try to provide

definitions that would satisfy these conditions and, at

the same time, capture the most essential aspects of

morality. There are two fundamental aspects that most

researchers find relevant in defining morality. One

emphasizes the inner sense of what is right and what

is wrong that we have as individuals; the other focuses

on morality as a set of shared values and norms. Most

definitions combine these two important aspects, even

if their emphasis may vary. Jean Decety’s definition,

for example, emphasizes the inner sense of right and

wrong that humans have about their behavior and that

of others (Decety & Cowell, 2016). Although this

definition is perfectly acceptable, it could emphasize

a common and inter-subjective nature of morality

more than it actually does. The definition offered by

Melanie Killen and her co-authors is more

comprehensive as it emphasizes both the individual

and social aspect of morality. In their view, morality

is “a set of principles regarding fairness, equality, and

justice that are held by individuals.” (Killen et al.,

2015, p. 162)

There are many perspectives on morality and its

origin. They differ from each other in methodologies,

epistemological approaches, and the kind of evidence

they use. The explanations they offer are often

interrelated and overlap with each other, which makes

a categorization of these perspectives a challenge.

Some see these perspectives falling into two major

groups: those that see morality as having an origin that

is independent of human mind and those that regard

moral precepts as human constructions. Another

popular subdivision is between explanations that

emphasize religion and those that seek explanations in

nature and biology.

None of these categorizations is really satisfactory,

even if some appear to be more suitable than others.

Edward O. Wilson, for example, divides the existing

perspectives on morality and its origin into two basic

groups: transcendentalists and empiricists. The

former, in his view, see morality as existing outside

the human mind; by contrast the latter group considers

moral guidelines to be “contrivances of the mind.”

(Wilson, 1998) Although Wilson’s categorization

makes more sense than many others, it is not

unproblematic: contrivances of human mind are not

always readily accessible to empirical observation,

which raises questions about designating this group as

empiricists.

Considering the difficulties in categorizing the

current perspectives, this article proposes its own

common-sense approach that divides the current

explanations according to the principle of

accessibility: those that see morality and its origin as

accessible to human understanding and those that do

not. Again, this categorization, like many others, may

not be perfect but in my opinion, it captures an

important aspect of the debates on morality.

Religion has traditionally played the dominant role

in the discourse on morality. Most, if not all, religious

explanations come to one basic answer: God is the

source of all moral truths. Even prominent secular

thinkers subscribe to this view. John Locke is one of

them. One of the pillars of the European

Enlightenment, Locke writes in his Essay Concerning

Human Understanding that the “true ground of

morality … can only be the will and law of God.”

The Origin of Morality and the Making of the Moral Predicament

(Locke, 1997, I.III.6)

Since the rise of modern scientific approaches to the

study of morality, religious interpretations have faced

steep competition. However, religion has still retained

its appeal among contemporary thinkers. William

Lane Craig, for instance, holds that “moral values

cannot exist without God,” and complains that

“Atheistic moral realists seem to lack any adequate

foundation in reality for moral values, but just leave

them floating in an unintelligible way.” (Heathwood,

2012, p. 1; Craig & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2004, pp. 18-

19) Even those who embrace the role of science,

biology, and evolution in the study of morality may

still recognize the primacy of God and religion in the

moral domain. Despite her acknowledgement that

much of morality can have an evolutionary origin,

Paulina Sanchez, for example, still affirms her belief

that God and religion are fundamental to moral

decisions. She writes:

“I hold God accountable for creation and thus I see

that God’s creations, when deciding to do the “right”

versus “wrong” thing, experience a third thought

process, which knows that the “right” thing to do is

what should be done even though it is the harder of

the choices” (Sanchez, 2017, p. 5).

The emphasis on the transcendent source of

morality constitutes both the strength and the main

weakness of the religious perspective. The strength of

this perspective is in its relative simplicity. However,

although the appeal of the religious perspective

remains strong, its emphasis that on inaccessibility of

the source of morality to human understanding

conflicts with the general spirit of our time that

privileges rational understanding over acceptance on

faith. For this reason, contemporary approaches based

on scientific theories and facts attract a growing

number of researchers.

The approaches that seek to make the domain of

morality and its origin accessible to human

understanding have their roots in the Enlightenment

tradition. David Hume was one of earliest thinkers of

the Enlightenment who drew the line between

morality and religion. He grounded morality in human

nature, rather than in divine disposition. He

considered human sympathy for others and for the

common good to be the source of moral sentiment and

attitudes; and this sympathy, in his view, had a natural,

not divine origin (Hume, 1989, Book III, Part I; Hume,

1983).

The evolutionary approach in understanding

morality and its origin includes many perspectives.

Their number is constantly growing as different

disciplines – for example, biology, neuroscience,

anthropology, sociology, and others – enter the field

and try to offer their insights and interpretations on the

subject. Although they greatly differ from each other,

their basic pattern is similar. They all see morality as

a product of adaptation to the conditions of life of

early humans. Charles Darwin was the founder of this

trend (Hodgson, 2013, pp. 513-14). In The Descent of

Man, Darwin wrote: “I fully subscribe to the judgment

of those writers who maintain that of all the

differences between man and the lower animals, the

moral sense or conscience is by far the most

important.” He regarded the enhanced ability to

cooperate to be the most significant distinction

between humans and their closest evolutionary

relatives (Smith, 2015).

Most of these interpretations follow the basic

Darwinian model. Even though they may differ in

their emphasis, they claim that the origin of morality

is in random variations and adaptations. Judith

Burkhart and her co-authors clearly articulate this

view when they write:

“Human morality can be understood as a

straightforward adaptation to this hunter-gatherer

lifestyle, in that it enables and stabilizes

interdependence (see also van Schaik et al., 2014).

According to this hypothesis, one key element of

morality, a prosocial predisposition, is crucial to

maintain food sharing with immatures and adults”

(Burkart et al., 2018, p. 3).

Perhaps the dominant perspective in the

evolutionary approach is the one that focuses on

sociality as the principal condition for the emergence

of morality. The proponents of this perspective argue

that human morality and its key elements owe their

existence to an adaptation of early humans to the

hunter-gatherer lifestyle. In his article “Morality after

Myth” James Hemming forcefully argues that that

social and moral values are generated by conditions of

communal life (Hemming, 2006, p. 39).

Michael Tomasello is one of the most prolific

contributors to this vein of thought. According to

Tomasello, the sense of obligation that humans feel

toward each other is a result of the evolution that

“forced humans into ever more cooperative ways of

life, especially when they are acquiring food and other

basic resources.” (Tomasello, 2018, p. 72; Tomasello,

2016) In his book A Natural History of Human

Morality Tomasello emphasizes what he thinks is a

crucial difference between humans and animals.

While animals procure their food through largely

solitary efforts, the evolution conditioned humans –

even early humans – to cooperate and collaborate with

each other in obtaining nutrition in ways that no other

animals – even the great apes – can do (Tomasello,

2016). In a similar vein, Dennis Krebs – another

researcher who emphasizes the role of sociality – thus

summarizes his view on the origin of morality:

“I submit that the mechanisms that give rise to

moral behaviors evolved to solve the social problems

that inevitably arise when individuals band together

to foster their interests. When individuals are able to

satisfy their needs, to survive, to reproduce and to rear

their offspring on their own, there is no need for them

to interact with other members of their species, and

therefore no need for morality. Mechanisms that

Gennady Shkliarevsky, 2025

induce individuals to form groups and socialize with

others were selected because such social behaviors

were adaptive in ancestral environments” (Krebs,

2005, pp. 747-71).

Interpretations that emphasize the role of culture in

generating and transmitting moral values form a

distinct subset in the perspective that focuses on

sociality. The proponents of such interpretations

recognize that social conditions form the background

for the rise of moral systems. However, they believe

that human morality is not simply a response to social

conditions. Rather, they stress the role of culture and

learning in fostering empathy in human society that

they see as the foundation for the development of

morality. In his book The War for Kindness: Building

Empathy in a Fractured World Jamil Zaki uses a vast

array of empirical evidence to make the point that

empathy and morale attitudes are more like a

teachable skill than a hardwired trait. Training in

empathy, he argues, even brings growth in empathy-

related parts of the brain (Zaki, 2019; Bok, 2019, pp.

120-21).

Albert Johnston expands this principle of sociality

well beyond human society. In his view, human

morality originates in the “perception of

preciousness.” Johnston argues that this “morality of

preciousness” can be applied well beyond the

boundaries of human society to animals, plants, and

nature more generally. He writes:

“As with the preciousness of humans, the

awareness of preciousness is what grounds an

obligation to honor, protect, and foster. When kept

salient, that awareness, like love, makes easy any

sacrifice involved, and is its own reward. Even a dead

leaf with its fascinating intricacy has the power to

delight, to console, and to make one appreciative of

one’s brief sojourn in the world” (Johnstone, 2018, p.

191).

Contractarians represent yet another noticeable

variation of the social perspective on the origin of

morality. They agree that in some way morality is

grounded in humans. However, they do not evoke

human nature or some other biological factor. Rather

they emphasize moral obligations that derive from the

agreements humans make in socially cohesive groups

(Heathwood, 2012, p. 2).

There is also a growing number of perspectives that

use psychology and neuroscience as their explanatory

tools. Patricia S. Churchland offers an interpretation

based on neuroscience and focuses on neural networks

and their operations as key to understanding the

emergence of moral sentiments and attitudes in

humans. Conscience, in her view, “is a brain construct

rooted in our neural circuitry, not a theological entity

thoughtfully parked in us by a divine being.” Human

moral responses, Churchland argues, are rooted in the

cortex, supported by more ancient brain structures and

neurochemicals (Churchland, 2019). Jean Decety is

another researcher that offers a similar view. He

maintains that humans develop their moral sense as a

result of the hardwiring of their brain (Decety &

Cowell, 2016).

Although interpretations of morality that originate

in neuroscience, the study of the architecture of the

brain, and psychology form a distinct group of their

own, just like the interpretations that emphasize

sociality, they remain firmly embedded within the

evolutionary approach. Ian Morris summarizes the

views of many who contribute to this line of thinking

when he writes:

“Although psychological models of morality are

equipped to account for some aspects and some

functions of morality, the only theoretical perspective

that is equipped to integrate these accounts under one

overriding framework and supply a basis for refining

them in gainful ways is the theory of evolution”

(Morris, 2015, p. 1).

Jean Decety reiterates this point when he writes:

“Psychological and neuroscience research both tell

us that morality, our mental ability to tell right from

wrong in our behaviors and the behaviors of others, is

a product of evolution.” (Decety & Cowell, 2016)

The appeal of the evolutionary approach is growing.

The principal attraction of this approach is its focus on

rational understanding. More and more disciplines

enter the evolutionary approach and enrich it with

their insights. As a result, the evolutionary approach

now represents a vast and rich aggregation of a variety

of perspectives and interpretations. Differentiation

rather than integration remains the prevalent trend,

and it tends to grow. Many contributors accept this

pluralist state and advocate the continued attendance

to all underpinnings of human moral codes--

biological, psychological, anthropological,

sociological and others – that have been theorized in

the field. Robert Hinde’s book Why Good is Good:

The Sources of Morality is one example of such

pluralist eclectic advocacy (Hinde, 2002).

The eclectic character of the current evolutionary

approach and the fact that it has not congealed into a

synthetic and comprehensive perspective are not the

only weaknesses of this approach. It is susceptible to

other cogent criticisms. One of them goes back to

Hume who has pointed out a fundamental flaw among

writers on the subject of morality (Hume, 1989, Book

III, Part I). Hume has noted that they often display a

tendency to shift their reasoning from statements of

fact to statements of moral obligation. In other words,

Hume argues that the domain of facts, or nature, is

very different from the moral domain that deals with

what ought to be, rather than is. Hume’s argument

became familiar to contemporary researchers as the

problem of OUGHT vs. IS.

The evolutionary approach that tries to explain

morality by physical facts is certainly vulnerable to

Hume’s criticism. Several modern critics point out

that although the evolutionary approach brings up

facts that may very well be pertinent to the origin of

The Origin of Morality and the Making of the Moral Predicament

morality, they do not demonstrate how these physical

facts have been translated into moral facts. In other

words, they do not demonstrate the connection

between the facts of nature and the facts of morality.

Philip Pettit points out that many contemporary

moral philosophers argue that moral concepts, or more

broadly normative terms, cannot be translated into

non-normative terms. Moral concepts simply cannot

be reduced to the naturalistic terms of science. “Most

of these thinkers,” Pettit writes, “treat one particular

normative concept as more basic than others,

especially in the realm of morality, but then insist that

that concept itself defies further analysis, in particular

analysis in non-normative terms.” (Pettit, 2018, pp.

722-35)

As Richard Joyce, among others, has argued,

OUGHT simply does not obtain from IS (Joyce, 2014;

Johnstone, 2018, p. 191).

There is yet another problem with the evolutionary

approach. Although there is a broad agreement that

evolutionary processes are relevant to the emergence

of morality, there are serious reservations as to

whether the biological evolution and the evolution of

culture have much in common. (Shkliarevsky, 2020)

However, the application of the Darwinian model of

the evolution in social sciences has, for a variety of

reasons, encountered a great deal of skepticism. As

Stefan Linquist notes in his Introduction to The

Evolution of Culture, “Darwinian theories of cultural

evolution are relative newcomers to the intellectual

landscape and their reception, especially within the

social sciences, hasn’t been overly enthusiastic.”

(Linquist, 2016) Social scientists have had and

continue to have reservations about the fit between the

Darwinian model and the evolution of culture and

society.

Many perspectives on cultural evolution share some

common features that are not present in the Darwinian

model. In contrast to the Darwinian model, they are

not “genetic” or “atomistic.” The Darwinian model

ascribes a very important role to random variations at

the level of genes as the source of novelty in the

biological evolution. Attempts to explain cultural

evolution by genetic variations or by variations of

some entities equivalent to genes – for example,

memes – have not been successful (Dawkins, 1990).

The evolution of culture and society just does not

seem to work on random variations and selection

(Shkliarevsky, 2020). Liana Gabora and Dean Keith

Simonton are two good examples of different views

on the cultural evolution that prevail in social

sciences. While Simonton sees the evolution of

culture in terms of variability and selection

(Simonton, 1999, p. 322), Gabora views it in terms of

self-organization and horizontal transmissions

(Gabora, 2019, p. 77). Finally, in contrast to the

Darwinian model that ascribes primary importance to

the vertical transmission of variations (from parents to

children), theoretical perspectives on cultural

evolution emphasize horizontal transmissions of traits

among members of the group, rather than vertical –

from parents to children (Bandura, 1977).

The objections of social scientists to the adoption of

the Darwinian model of the evolution have no easy

solutions. These objections suggest that we might

have to accept two distinct modes of evolution – one

for nature and another for culture and society. In this

case the evolution no longer appears to be a unitary

and continuous process. Indeed, in this sense the

evolution of life appears to be an exception rather than

the rule since the evolution of reality before the

emergence of life also does not conform to the

Darwinian model. The obvious question why nature

would make such exception is not easy to answer.

The persistence of deep divisions is another

problem that continues to plague the evolutionary

approach. One of the most important of these divisions

is the gap that separates the perspectives that

emphasize social conditions and the perspectives that

emphasize emotions. Neither side has sufficient

explanatory power to provide a definitive

interpretation. Many argue in favor of producing a

synthesis that would unite the two sides. Yet despite

decades of hard work, this inner dualism remains

unresolved, which is perhaps the main reason why the

evolutionary approach has so far failed to produce a

definitive theory of morality and its origin.

Finally, the evolutionary approach has yet another

unresolved issue that remains a source of controversy.

The approach has not established a clear demarcation

of the moral domain. The lack of clear demarcation

creates ambiguity that goes back to Darwin himself.

In The Descent of Man, Darwin writes: “I fully

subscribe to the judgment of those writers who

maintain that of all the differences between man and

the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by

far the most important.” (Smith, 2015) Yet, in the

same volume Darwin suggests that the difference

between humans and animals is one of degree, not

kind and that even self-consciousness may not be

exclusively a human property. He also sees in animals

such human features as social instinct, parental and

filial affection, and others. Based on these

characteristics, Darwin concludes that “any animal

whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts,

the parental and filial affections being here included,

would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience,

as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well,

or nearly as well developed, as in man.” (Wilson,

2010, pp. 275-87; Darwin, 1882, p. 98)

Darwin’s ambiguity with regard to morality and

animals is not a fluke or a fortuitous turn of phrase.

The source of this ambiguity is Darwin’s very model

of evolution that has not solve the problem of the

relationship between continuity and discontinuity in

the evolutionary process (Shkliarevsky, 2019, pp. 1-

30). Issues related to this problem reoccur in theories

based on Darwin’s teaching. They made their way into

Gennady Shkliarevsky, 2025

the debates about the moral standing of animals. The

questions relevant to morality in animals keep

popping up in the debates on the origin of morality.

Geoffrey Hodgson, for example, emphasizes in his

article the more exclusive approach to morality as a

human phenomenon. “A moral being,” he argues

“...is one who is capable of comparing his past and

future actions or motives and of approving or

disapproving of them. We have no reason to suppose

that any of the lower animals have this capacity....

Man ... alone can, with certainty, be ranked as a moral

being.” (Hodgson, 2013, pp. 513-14)

By contrast, Judith Burkart and her co-authors,

express a dissenting view when they write:

“The ultimate function of human morality and its

key elements can thus readily be understood as an

adaptation to the hunter-gatherer lifestyle. But are

these elements unique to humans, or can some of them,

or perhaps their precursors, also be found in other

primates, and if so, why?” (Burkart et al., 2018, p. 3)

As they also point out, the questions about the

philogenetic origin of morality in non-human species

are very important for evaluating the functional

hypotheses on the origin of morality.

The view that at least some species of animals are

moral subjects is currently an established trend in the

study of the philogenetic origin of morality. Mark

Rowlands has made it the main theme of his book Can

Animals Be Moral? that has provoked heated debates.

In this book, Rowlands argues that animals

“...can act for moral reasons – at least there are no

compelling reasons for supposing that that they can’t.

Animals can act on the basis of moral emotions –

emotions that possess moral content – and these

emotions provide reasons for their actions. Animals

can, in this sense, be moral subjects” (Rowlands,

2012).

The exchanges that followed the publication of this

book have not resulted in a conclusive verdict

(Fitzpatrick, 2017, pp. 1151-83).

“While pursuing explanations that seek to firmly

embed human morality in the evolution of nature,

some researchers are so eager to plant the roots of

morality in the evolution of nature that they end up

making arguments that extend the domain of morality

deep inside the animal kingdom. Irina Mikhalevich

and Russell Powell, for example, argue that the

exclusion of the vast majority of arthropods from

moral standing is unwarranted, particularly given the

purported evidence for cognition and sentience in

these organisms” (Mikhalevich & Powell, 2020).

2. The Origin of Morality

The brief overview of the current perspectives on

morality and its origin shows that the field remains

very much in flux. The approach that views this

subject as largely inaccessible to human

understanding and relegates it to the domain of faith

and religion remains influential. However, this

approach runs against the dominant trend in the

contemporary culture that seeks to expand the sphere

of rational understanding and, as a result, loses its

appeal. By contrast, the approach that seeks to make

the subject of morality more accessible to human

understanding is becoming increasingly attractive for

new generations of secular thinkers and scientists.

However, the mere accumulation of theoretical

perspectives during decades of research has not led to

a productive synthesis and has left the field in a

fragmented state.

There are two principal problems that plague the

evolutionary approach. One is the problem of

grounding. Many researchers have reached a

conclusion that the study of morality should be based

on facts and these facts should be located “outside the

proper domain of morality”; in other words, morality

should be grounded in factual truths, or the domain of

IS (Johnstone, 2018). The second unsolved problem is

how to connect the non-moral to the moral; in other

words how to bridge the domain of facts, or IS, with

the domain of OUGHT. (Heathwood, 2012; Morris,

2015)

The two problems are obviously interrelated. Their

interrelationship raises a question. Morality is the

domain of obligation and duty. Where does this sense

of duty and obligation come from and why?

The domain of morality belongs to the general

sphere of consciousness. Therefore, we must start with

consciousness in tracing the origin of the sense of duty

and obligation. Consciousness represents the level of

mental organization that regulates unconscious mental

operations. It emerges from interactions of mental

images that are the extension of sensory-motor

operations into the mental sphere. Jean Piaget has left

us a credible description of the process that gives rise

to mental images (Piaget, 1998). According to his

description, the process that leads to the emergence of

mental images has roots in conservation. Sensory-

motor operations conserve themselves by interacting

with each other: the more they interact and activate

each other, the better they are conserved. Interactions

of different sensory-motor operations combine their

differences, which creates a new and more powerful

level of organization that gives rise to mental images.

Manipulations and interactions conserve mental

images and open the path that leads to the emergence

of consciousness.

Thus, conservation plays an essential role in the

emergence of consciousness. Conservation is a

transcendent function. It transcends the realm of

mental operations or even biological operations and

the domain of life. Conservation is ubiquitous in our

universe. It is a truly universal function that operates

on the cosmic scale.

As has been mentioned, conservation of sensory-

The Origin of Morality and the Making of the Moral Predicament

motor operations creates a new and more powerful

level of organization. Therefore, conservation leads to

creation. Conservation and creation are intimately

related. Conservation requires the creation of new and

increasingly more powerful levels of organization

and, thus, to evolution. The interrelationship between

conservation, creation, and evolution sustains the

universe and is the source of all that exists in this

universe (Shkliarevsky, 2007, pp. 323-32;

Shkliarevsky, 2017).

Since consciousness is a product of the transcendent

process that creates it, consciousness naturally inherits

the properties of this process. Also, consciousness

regulates mental operations. Regulation is a reflective

function. Since consciousness is a reflective function,

it reflects the general properties of the process that has

created it. Consciousness expresses these properties in

ways and forms that are characteristic for the level of

mental organization that sustains consciousness. In

other words, consciousness expresses them in the

form of concepts and ideas. Therefore, in order to

understand the source of the sense of obligation and

duty, we must understand the properties of the process

of creation.

As has already been explained, the process of

creation is absolutely essential for sustaining our

universe. The universe simply cannot exist without the

process of creation. In other words, the process of

creation is absolutely necessary. This essential and

necessary character of the process of creation is its

very important property. Consciousness inherits this

property and expresses it in the form of the sense of

obligation and duty.

The necessary nature of the process of creation is

not the only property of this process reflected in

consciousness. The good and goodness are two

important concepts that are integral to morality. The

meaning of these two concepts is very broad. They are

notoriously difficult to define in specific terms.

However, they do convey the general sense of what

we regard as something that is universally beneficial –

a sense of universality. Universality is another

property that characterizes the process of creation as

this process sustains the universe and all in it. The

concepts of the good and goodness are the forms in

which consciousness captures and reflects this

important aspect of the process of creation – its

universality.

Moral codes also include the concept of individual

responsibility. This concept reflects the awareness of

autonomy and the sense of obligation associated with

autonomy. As has been explained elsewhere

(Shkliarevsky, 2021), the process of creation works on

inclusion. Inclusion is no mere aggregation of entities.

Inclusion involves the creation of combinations that

conserve the properties of entities involved in these

combinations. In other words, the capacity to conserve

autonomy is also an important feature of the process

of creation. Consciousness and morality capture and

reflect this feature in the concept of individual and

personal responsibility.

Sociality is another important feature that is

relevant to the domain of morality. The capacity to

interact with other individuals has played an essential

role in the emergence and evolution of consciousness

and morality. In the course of social interactions

humans externalize their inner mental constructs and

create combinations that give rise to new and

increasingly more powerful levels of organization.

The capacity to create new levels of organization plays

a crucial role in the evolution of the human mind, the

emergence of consciousness, language, and culture

more generally, including moral values. Numerous

studies emphasize the role of sociality in the

emergence of both consciousness and morality.

Human sociality embodies an important aspect of the

process of creation.

The capacity to create new and increasingly more

powerful levels of organization certainly pre-existed

the rise of human consciousness and morality. This

capacity has roots in the process of creation that works

on inclusion. The moral imperative of equality is the

reflection of this feature of the process of creation on

the level of consciousness and morality.

Many researchers point out the important role that

emotions – empathy, sympathy, and compassion--play

in the moral domain. However, neither consciousness

nor morality is the source of emotional responses. As

the most powerful level of mental organization,

consciousness can only regulate emotions. Emotions

originate in the realm of the unconscious.

Emotional responses are associated with

gratification; and gratification has its roots in

conservation. When we exercise our sensory-motor

functions (visual, audio, gustatory, olfactory, and

tactile), we gratify and thus conserve them. Infants, for

example, smile when they see a familiar face that

activates their visual function. Conversely, an

unfamiliar face will produce a negative reaction since

its sight does not affirm the familiar visual schema.

As has been emphasized, the process of creation

and conservation are intimately related. The process

that creates new and increasingly more powerful level

of organization conserves the very action that

constitutes this process. The act of conservation takes

the form of gratification in living organisms and in the

course of the biological evolution enters the sphere of

neural interactions, or mental operations. Since

consciousness regulates mental operations, it is

capable of reflecting on emotional responses; through

consciousness emotional responses enter the domain

of morality.

The perspective on the origin of morality outlined

in this study shows that morality is part of the broader

sphere of consciousness. Therefore, the origin of

morality is integrally related to the origin and

evolution of consciousness. Consciousness inherits

and reflects the principal features of the process that

Gennady Shkliarevsky, 2025

has led to its emergence. Through consciousness these

features acquire forms that enter the domain of

morality. Our moral norms and values are reflections

of these fundamental features. Although these forms

may differ in different cultural environments, they all

have their source in the process of creation that led to

the emergence of consciousness and morality.

3. The Making of the Moral Predicament

The moral imperative of equality that is widely

recognized as the fundamental moral principle

presupposes an obligation to treat all humans as

equals. As one can see, this principle is about

inclusion of all humans in the community of equals.

The connection between this imperative and the

process of creation is clear. The process of creation

works on inclusion.

As has been pointed out, inclusion is no mere

aggregation. Inclusion involves combination of

properties and their conservation. Thus, one can see

that the moral imperative of equality realizes inclusion

– this important property of the process of creation –

on the level of mental organization that sustains

consciousness and morality. It is an equivalent of

inclusion manifested in consciousness.

Despite the importance of the imperative of

equality, our practice does not realize this fundamental

moral principle. There is a glaring discrepancy

between this widely recognized moral principle and

the dominant social practice. This section will explain

why this discrepancy, or the moral predicament,

persists.

Few people, if any, dispute the importance of the

principle of equality. Yet the fact that the existing

practice does not conform to this principle is also

indisputable. Since this discrepancy occurs in the

domain of practical application, one can only conclude

that its source is in practice.

Consciousness and morality are ultimately

evolutionary products of the process of creation. This

process is transcendent; it transcends the level of

mental organization that sustains consciousness and

morality. In fact, this process transcends all other

levels of organization that preceded the emergence of

consciousness and even the realm of life. As this study

has indicated the process of creation sustains the entire

universe and all that is in it.

The level of mental organization that gives rise to

consciousness and morality has its ultimate source in

the process of creation. However, this level of

organization also has its immediate source of origin in

the level of mental organization that sustains sensory-

motor operations. Interactions among sensory-motor

functional operations (visual, audio, olfactory, tactile,

and gustatory) create combinations that constitute

mental images. The emergence of mental images takes

the evolution of the mind onto the path toward the

emergence of consciousness.

The level of organization that sustains

consciousness is the most powerful level of mental

organization. As such, it regulates the mental

operations that preceded its emergence. Regulation is

essentially a reflective function. Thus, consciousness

emerges as a capacity to reflect on sensory-motor

operations and their products. When consciousness

emerges, it is focused primarily on these objects and

engages in their manipulation. The transcendent

process that was involved in the creation of mental

objects escapes the immediate attention of

consciousness. In other words, when consciousness

emerges, it has no awareness of the process of

creation; it is only aware of those operations that led

to its emergence and the products of these operations,

or mental images.

The emergent consciousness takes mental images

for granted, totally unaware of internal operations that

have created them and the process that was involved

in their creation. The mind relates these mental

constructs to reality; it takes these representations of

reality for reality. To the emergent consciousness,

mental images appear as reflections of external reality.

As a result, the mind sees external reality as the source

of its mental representations. The entire process of

creation of these mental objects remains largely

outside the main focus of conscious awareness.

Consciousness does not “see” this process and does

not reflect on it. Thus, consciousness finds itself in a

double bind: it reflects the features of the process of

creation to which it ultimately owes its existence, but

it does not reflect on this process. It does not relate this

process to its immediate apprehensions of reality and

to mental representations.

Consciousness can only view the process of

creation in the same way it views any other mental

object--as a creation of external forces that are not

accessible to human understanding. As long as the

mind does not understand the way this process

operates, it cannot have any control over it. Like all

other mental objects, the process of creation appears

to the mind as part of the external reality, not

something performed in its own inner workings.

Early humans recognized the existence of the

process of creation, but they largely regarded it as

inaccessible to human understanding. They

spontaneously and uncritically projected their own

representations of reality on reality. Nature looked to

them very anthropomorphic.

This early experience established a pattern whereby

the process we use in creating our views of reality,

while in plain view, remained largely inaccessible to

human understanding. For example, many pagan

cultures acknowledged and venerated the creative

powers of nature. However, they viewed them as

largely inaccessible to human understanding. These

powers were in the domain of gods. The creative

power of God is central to the Judeo-Christian

tradition. Like pagan religions, the Judeo-Christian

The Origin of Morality and the Making of the Moral Predicament

tradition recognizes God the Creator, but it also deems

the process God and divine actions as inaccessible to

human understanding. Creation in Christianity is a

mystery that humans can approach only through faith,

not reason. Thus, all pre-modern cultures recognized

the centrality of creation in the cosmic order, but they

placed it outside the boundaries of human

understanding.

The secular culture of modernity has marginalized

religion. Creation has largely lost its appeal in the

context of secularism and science with its emphasis on

reason and rational analysis. The lack of interest in

creation has perpetuated the pre-modern attitude

toward creation as largely inaccessible to human

understanding. For all practical purposes, modern

civilization has ignored the process of creation and

relegated it to the domain of the arts and literature.

As a result, human understanding of the process of

creation has been and remains very limited

(Shkliarevsky, 2017). Despite the fact that this process

plays the central role in human relationship with

reality, humans have paid relatively little attention to

it. It is peripheral to all major theoretical perspectives.

We know little about it and study it even less

(Shkliarevsky, 2017). Margaret Boden, one of the pre-

eminent researchers in the field of creativity, draws

the following conclusion in her influential book:

“Our ignorance of our own creativity is very great.

We are not aware of all the structural constraints

involved in particular domains, still less of the ways

in which they can be creatively transformed. We use

creative heuristics, but know very little about what

they are or how they work. If we do have any sense of

these matters, it is very likely tacit rather than explicit:

many people can be surprised by a novel harmony, but

relatively few can explicitly predict even a plagal

cadence” (Boden, 2004, p. 246).

As has already been explained, the imperative of

equality is the representation of inclusion – an

essential feature of the process of creation. The

process of creation and inclusion are integral to each

other. The process of creation requires inclusion; it

simply will not work without inclusion. The converse

is also true: inclusion also requires the process of

creation; there is no inclusion without the process of

creation. When the process of creation is ignored,

when we do not understand the way it works, the

implementation of the moral imperative of equality

becomes impossible

Since the process of creation is universal, the

inclusion it requires must also be universal. Partial or

selective inclusion is simply a form of exclusion. The

practicing of universal inclusion is the only way to

realize the imperative of equality. In order to practice

inclusion, we have to understand what inclusion

involves. Inclusion is no mere aggregation of

differences. Inclusion involves combination of

properties, not their addition. Combinations of

properties creates a new and more powerful level of

organization that includes all properties as its

particular cases – that is, cases that are valid under

specific conditions or assumptions.

If we do not practice universal inclusion, we create

a discrepancy between the principle we recognize as

essential for moral behavior and the practice that fails

to implement this principle. Our failure to practice

universal inclusion is not a product of ill will. We

simply cannot practice it and realize the moral

imperative of equality if we do not understand how the

process of creation works. This discrepancy is the

source of the moral predicament.

4. Solving the Problem of the Moral

Predicament

This article has argued that the moral predicament

– the discrepancy between the widely accepted moral

imperative for equality and the social practice that

tolerates, condones, and perpetuates inequality – has

been and remains the source of moral outrage that

fuels discontent, tensions, and disruptions in our

civilization. The article has also explained that the

moral predicament is an inevitable outcome of the

failure to recognize, embrace, and understand the

process of creation that is fundamental to human

existence.

As has been explained in the preceding section, the

moral predicament is the discrepancy between the

widely recognized moral imperative of equality and

the social practice that dominates our civilization. The

imperative of equality is a reflection of the essential

character of the process of creation – its inclusionary

nature. From early history, humans did not deem this

process to be accessible to human understanding.

Even today, our knowledge of the process of creation

that plays a very important role in our relationship

with reality and our understanding of the way this

process works remain very limited. Due to limited

understanding of this process, we could not apply it in

our practice. As a result, could not practice inclusion,

which means that our commitment of the imperative

of equality remained largely theoretical, having little

practical application. The result is the discrepancy

between the imperative of equality and our social

practice that has plagued and continues to plague

human civilization.

History shows that although people can tolerate this

double standard for some time, they will not tolerate it

indefinitely. They have strong antipathy to uncertainty

and ambivalence of such duality. They aspire to

wholeness and integrity and find the persistence of

contradictions emotionally tortuous and unacceptable.

Humans can live for some time with the moral

predicament, but they cannot tolerate it forever. At

some point, they rise and demand a solution that

would end this predicament.

One can see two ways to end the moral

Gennady Shkliarevsky, 2025

predicament. One way would be to abandon the moral

imperative of equality and accept the existing practice.

Another way would be to change our social practice

so that it conforms to the requirements of the moral

imperative of equality. The first way is not a real

possibility, not as a permanent solution. The

imperative of equality originates in the process of

creation that sustains more than just our personal lives

or even the life of humanity; this process sustains our

entire universe and all that is in it. We can use this

process for our benefit or we can continue to shun it at

our peril, but we cannot change it. The only realistic

path toward solving the problem of the moral

predicament is to change our social practice and bring

it into conformity with our deeply felt commitment to

the imperative of equality and the process of creation.

The process of creation is fundamental to our

existence. It is essential for our survival. It is the

source of our morality. There is no morality without

the process of creation. Ignoring this process is not a

viable choice. Therefore, we must reshape our social

practice in accordance with the main features of the

process of creation.

The process of creation works on inclusion – not

selective inclusion that is a form of exclusion, but

inclusion that is universal. The imperative of equality

is the reflection of this important property of the

process of creation in our consciousness and the

domain of morality, Therefore, we must reform our

social practice on the basis of the process of creation

as its main organizing principle. The moral imperative

of equality, or the principle of universal inclusion,

should be integral to the foundation of our social

practice

Inclusion is not a mere aggregation. Inclusion

requires the creation of combinations. Equilibration is

the operation that generates combinations. Since

equilibration creates new and more powerful levels of

organization, it produces disequilibrium that requires

re-equilibration. The process of creation maintains a

balance between equilibration and the production of

disequilibrium, or between equilibrium and

disequilibrium. This balance is essential for the

functioning of the process of creation; it is what makes

this process work.

The balance between hierarchical and non-

hierarchical interactions is another important aspect of

the process of creation. As this article has

demonstrated, both types of interactions as important

for the operation of the process of creation: non-

hierarchical interactions create new and increasingly

more powerful levels of organization and hierarchical

interactions conserve and optimize these creations.

Our moral practice should embody this important

feature of the process of creation.

As has already been explained, our current practice

is largely exclusive. The failure to embrace the

process of creation leads to rivalry as differences

engage in competition for dominance. The process of

creation is not about competition and neither it is

about cooperation. This process is about the creation

of new and increasingly more powerful levels of

organization. The process subsumes both competition

and cooperation among differences as aspects that are

integral to this process. Although this process requires

inclusion of all differences, it also requires that that

these differences should retain their autonomy as

particular cases on the created whole. Our moral

practice should not pursue the elimination of

differences; on the contrary, it should conserve them

as particulars of a new and more comprehensive

whole. Such practice will realize the imperative of

equality and thus will solve the problem of the moral

predicament.

5. Conclusion

Morality is among the most powerful motivators of

human behavior. Moral sentiments and convictions

are not merely subjective experiences, although they

are this too; they also have their source in objective

facts. They originate in fundamental processes that

transcend our individual life; these processes sustain

our entire universe. That is the reason why people

often see instances of injustice and unfairness as more

than simply a personal offense but as violations of the

cosmic order and harmony.

As history shows, the reaction to such perceptions

can be and often is powerful. It can cause intense

moral outrage. History provides numerous examples

when moral outrage led to upheavals against social

and political order that was perceived as unjust and

unfair. Moral outrage is an important contributor to

the current turmoil in the United States and elsewhere.

This article has argued, perceptions of injustice and

unfairness are not merely a result of subjective

experience. They have an objective source in the

existence of the moral predicament. This article shows

that the moral predicament is not a fancy or a figment

of imagination. It is a result of real objective

conditions. The cause of the moral predicament is the

discrepancy between the widely accepted imperative

of equality and the actual social practice that accepts,

tolerates, and perpetuates unequal treatment.

It is beyond the scope of this article to provide

details and specifics as to what the new moral practice

should look like. The purpose of this article is to bring

attention to the problem of the moral predicament,

reveal its source, and show the path to its solution. The

practical implementation of the solution requires more

discussions and more experimental work. My hope is

that this article will lead to the recognition of the need

to solve the problem of the moral predicament and will

stimulate efforts to reform our current moral practice.

The article offers no prescriptions and does not

describe specific forms that the new practice should

embody. It is important to approach the creation of

new practice with an open mind. The very nature of

The Origin of Morality and the Making of the Moral Predicament

this new practice demands universal inclusion. There

is only one condition that this author deems

inescapable: the process of creation should serve as

the foundation for all these efforts. The commitment

to this process should not be merely in the form of

theoretical acceptance of its validity. Those who will

devote their minds, time, and energy to this

transformation should use this process in their own

practical interactions with each other. They should not

view this process as merely a theoretical possibility.

This process should be firmly imbedded in their own

actions.

The very process of transforming the social practice

should be the arena in which the process of creation

will be applied in interactions among those who will

be involved in this effort. Only under such conditions

the process of creation will not be merely a vision for

the future to which we will periodically bow in

ritualistic obeisance. Rather, the understanding of this

process should be the manual for practical interactions

of all creators involved in transforming our social

practice. Only under such condition our efforts will be

successful.

Conflicts of interest

The author(s) states that there is no conflict of

interests.

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